The aim of this paper is to analyze bank competition in Russia by measuring the market power of Russian banks and its determinants over the period [2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007] with the Lerner index. Earlier studies on bank competition have focused on developed countries whereas this paper contributes to the analysis of bank competition in emerging markets. We find that bank competition has only slightly improved during the period studied. The mean Lerner index for Russian banks is of the same magnitude as those observed in developed countries, which suggests that the Russian banking industry is not plagued by weak competition. Furthermore, we find no greater market power for state-controlled banks nor less market power for foreign-owned banks. We would consequently qualify the procompetitive role of foreign bank entry and privatization. Finally, our analysis of the determinants of market power enables the identification of several factors that influence competition, including market concentration and risk as well as the nonlinear influence of size.
I. Introduction
In the wake of major structural changes in banking industries around the globe, the impact of bank competition on economic growth has generated increasing interest in the literature of recent years. Since banks play a key role in the financing of the economy, changes in bank competition are supposed to exert an impact on access to bank finance in the form of lower loan rates or relaxing of financing constraints (Cetorelli and Bank competition is even more important for economic growth in emerging countries. First, these countries are characterized by low ratios of credit to GDP, which may be a result of the financing obstacles created by subdued banking competition.
Second, bank lending is the leading source of external finance in these countries, owing notably to underdeveloped capital markets. In spite of this, earlier studies investigating the level and the determinants of bank competition focus instead on developed countries (e.g. Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez, 2005).
Russia is a very interesting example of such an emerging market. Bank lending is stunningly low, with a ratio of domestic credit to GDP of 25.7% in 2005, compared with a world average of 55.8% (EBRD, 2006) . At the same time, bank lending represents the largest source of external finance for companies 1 . This picture has not changed despite impressive economic and banking-sector growth in recent years, including a doubling of the ratio of banking sector assets to GDP. 1 The 2009 OECD report on Russia also stresses the importance of bank lending by mentioning that "Russia has seen the rapid evolution of securities markets and other non-bank financial activity, especially in the past 8 years or so, but banking still accounts for almost all financial intermediation" (OECD, 2009, p.122) competition is measured by the Lerner index. This measure of market power directly infers a bank's conduct and then informs on the actual behavior of the bank. First, we measure the level and the evolution of the market power of Russian banks during the period of study. We assess the level of market power of banks in Russia and compare it with other countries. We also investigate whether strong economic growth influenced banking competition in recent years.
Second, we investigate whether market power depends on ownership. Third, we analyze the determinants of market power for Russian banks. This is done to provide relevant insights for economic policy, by identifying factors which can be influenced so as to enhance bank competition. Furthermore, this analysis allows us to examine the extent to which these determinants are similar to those observed in other The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Russian banking industry. Section 3 sets out the methodology and data. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
II. Russian banking sector, 1998-2008
In stark contrast to the volatile 1990s and the financial and economic crisis of 1998, the last ten years have witnessed a Russian banking sector starting to resemble banking sectors in many other emerging economies. Russian banks by and large take in retail deposits, provide credits to both households and enterprises, engage in fairly standard operations in capital markets, and issue bonds; some even participate in international loan syndications.
The Russian ruble has been freely convertible since The main difference is that no major bank privatization has ever occurred in Russia on the scale that was seen in Central European countries. The state has retained control over some of the Soviet-era sectoral banks, notably the major savings bank Sberbank and foreign-trade banks VTB-Vnestorgbank and VEB-Vnesekonbank. The large state-controlled banks have been significant players in the market throughout the post-Soviet period.
The corollary of this is that the private banks are mostly de novo banks, established in the early 1990s. Russia still has a very large number of private banks, most of them miniscule. Many of them are believed to be pocket-banks of an industrial group and to have little if any exposure to the interbank markets. There were more than 1300 banks operating in Russia in 2000. This number has decreased significantly over the last ten years even though the banking sector as a whole has grown substantially (see Table   1 ).
Due to the sheer size of the country, Russia's banking system entails wide regional variation. where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w 1 the price of labor (ratio of personnel expenses to total assets) 4 , w 2 the price of physical capital (ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets), w 3 the price of borrowed funds (ratio of interest paid to total funding). Total costs are the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses and interest paid. The indices for each bank have been dropped from the presentation for the sake of simplicity. The estimated coefficients of the cost function are then used to compute the marginal cost (MC): 
TC MC
Once marginal cost is estimated and the price of output computed we can calculate the Lerner index for each bank and obtain a direct measure of bank competition.
III.2 Data and variables
We use quarterly bank-level data from the financial information agency Interfax.
Our sample is composed of observations from the first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2007. To ensure that a bank carries out lending activities, we keep only banks with more than 5% of loans in total assets. Our final sample consists of over 24.000 bank quarter observations, which are available for the estimations. The data on bank foreign ownership is from the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). We define a bank to be foreignowned if the foreign ownership share in its assets exceeds 50%. State-controlled banks are defined using the list provided in Vernikov (2007) . Information on bank branches by regions is collected from the CBR website. Regional data are from Rosstat and the investor risk rating from the Russian rating agency ExpertRA 5 .
In the estimations, we analyze the determinants of the market power of Russian would be a better measure of risk, but it cannot be used, for data availability reasons.
Next to the four key determinants, we add some variables of particular interest for Russian banks. We add dummy variables for foreign ownership (Foreign Ownership) and state ownership (State Ownership), in accordance with the potential role of ownership.
We show that there are differences in market power between different ownership categories, which evolve over time; hence the link between these ownership forms and market power is ambiguous over the period. Furthermore, we include a variable for investor risk, which includes legal, economic, financial, social, criminal, ecological and administrative components (Investor Risk). Indeed a major concern in Russia is the weak institutional environment, which results in a notably high level of corruption by international standards (Weill, 2008) . Studies have however shown the existence of strong differences in institutional environment among Russian regions, so the potential impact of investor risk should be considered. Finally, we control for the business cycle by including regional growth of industrial production (Industrial Growth).
Dummy variables for each quarter and each year are also included in the estimations, to control for seasonal and yearly effects.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Table 2 .
IV. Results
This section provides the analysis of market power of Russian banks. We begin by providing information on the level and evolution of the Lerner index for Russian banks.
We then investigate whether these indices differ by bank ownership. Next we analyze the determinants of market power of Russian banks.
IV.1 Market power of Russian banks
We present the estimates of market power for Russian banks for each year in Table   3 . We observe that the average Lerner index for the period is 21.4%. The analysis of the mean Lerner index for the Russian banking industry is of utmost interest to investigate average bank behavior. However, the appraisal of the macroeconomic effects of changes in bank competition notably through changes in loan rates needs to consider differently banks according to their market share. As mentioned above, there are huge differences in size among Russian banks and, notably, a market share of about 30% for the largest bank (Sberbank). Therefore, we also measure the mean Lerner index weighted by market shares of banks in total banking sector assets. These figures are also presented in Table 3 .
We point out two striking findings. On the one hand, the trend for the mean weighted Lerner index is similar to the one observed with the standard mean Lerner index. We still observe a slight reduction of the market power, supporting the view of moderately enhanced bank competition. On the other hand, the mean weighted Lerner index has lower values than the standard Lerner index, which supports the view of a level of bank competition in Russia similar to that in other countries.
As a consequence, our main finding is that, in spite of the major changes in Russia in recent years, including strong economic growth and banking reforms (e.g. the deposit insurance scheme), bank competition has only slightly improved in recent years. One can notably wonder why the changes in the banking industry, such as the increasing market share for foreign banks, have not enhanced bank competition. To this end, it is interesting to investigate market power by ownership type.
IV.2 Market power by ownership type
As mentioned above, the Russian banking industry is characterized by a persistently large market share for state-controlled banks and a relatively small market share of foreign-owned banks, in comparison with the other transition countries. Thus, it is interesting to investigate how these characteristics influence banks' behavior in Russia.
We investigate whether foreign-owned, state-controlled and domestic private banks differ in market power and thus aim to uncover whether the ownership structure of the Russian banking industry affects bank competition. Table 4 Thus, our major finding is for the existence of significant differences in market power of banks depending on ownership. These differences are of utmost interest for understanding the main pattern of the evolution of bank competition over the period, but they also inform policy recommendations concerning competition.
Indeed we observe that our finding of decreasing market power over time for
Russian banks -which was observed for all Russian banks, whether considered as equal or weighted by market share (i.e. enabling a strong influence of state-controlled banks) -is driven by the behavior of state-controlled and domestic private banks, and not at all by the behavior of foreign-owned banks. We cannot conclude that foreign bank entry per se promotes competition. However, the competitive pressures exerted by foreign-owned banks may have contributed to the reduction in the market power of domestic banks.
Thus, our findings do not contradict the commonly accepted view in the literature that foreign bank presence is associated with greater competition in the banking market (e.g.
Claessens and Laeven, 2004
). Furthermore, the considerable reduction of market power for state-controlled banks over time, resulting in less market power among all categories of banks, does not argue for their privatization for competitive reasons.
IV.3 Determinants of market power of Russian banks
We now investigate the determinants of market power for Russian banks. In line with former studies, we perform random-effects regressions of Lerner indices on a set of variables. The results are displayed in Table 5 . Nevertheless, this study is only the first one to investigate bank competition in Russia, and further analysis is needed to confirm our conclusions. 
